When modeling the behavior of firms, marketers and micro-economists routinely confront complex problems of strategic interaction. In competitive environments, firms make strategic decisions that not only depend on the features of the market, but also on their beliefs regarding the reactions of their rivals. Structurally modeling these interactions requires formulating and estimating a discrete game, a task which, until recently, was considered intractable. Fortunately, two-step estimation methods (imported from the auction literature) have cracked the problem, fueling a growing literature in both marketing and economics that tackles a host of issues from the optimal design of ATM networks to the choice of pricing strategy. However, most existing methods have focused on only the discrete choice of actions, ignoring a wealth of information contained in post-choice outcome data and severely limiting the scope for performing informative counterfactuals or identifying the deep structural parameters that drive strategic decisions. The goal of this paper is to provide a method for incorporating post-choice outcome data into static discrete games of incomplete information. In particular, our estimation approach adds a selection correction to the two-step games approach, allowing the researcher to use revenue data, for example, to recover the costs associated with alternative actions. Alternatively, a researcher might use R&D expenses to back out the returns to innovation.
Introduction
By focusing on the nexus between firms and consumers, marketers and micro-economists continually confront problems of strategic or social interaction. The decision of where to locate a retail store not only depends on the specific capabilities of the firm in question and the customers to whom it wishes to sell its products, but also on the strategic reactions of its rivals. Similarly, the decision of which gym to join may depend on whether a person's spouse or friends belong, as well as how often they intend to go. Not surprisingly, structural models of strategic and social interaction are gaining traction in both fields, providing insight into a host of issues from the optimal design of ATM networks to the decision of whether and with whom to play golf. However, due to both limitations in data availability and constraints inherent in the modeling approach, researchers have almost exclusively focused on discrete outcomes, treating profit or utility as a latent variable, usually parameterized via a reduced form. While this makes efficient use of the often limited data at hand, it can severely limit the usefulness of the model for performing informative counterfactuals or identifying the deep parameters that drive these strategic interactions. For example, in their study of supermarket pricing behavior, Ellickson and Misra (2008) found strong evidence that supermarket chains favor strategies that accord with their rivals, but were unable to pin down exactly why such assortative matching was in fact beneficial to the firms. The goal of this paper is to provide a method for incorporating additional, post-choice outcome data into structural models of static discrete games that would allow the researcher to obtain more nuanced insights into a firm's decision making and the nature of strategic interactions across firms.
Our approach combines classic techniques from the literature on selection (Heckman (1974 (Heckman ( , 1979 , Robb (1985, 1986) , Ahn and Powell (1993) ) with recent twostep approaches to estimating discrete games (Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) , Bajari et al. (2006) ). The basic idea is quite simple. With data on only discrete outcomes (e.g. entry, location, pricing strategy), we can recover the strategic parameters that govern profitability using existing methods adapted from the discrete choice literature. If, in addition, we also observe post-choice outcome data (e.g. revenues or costs), we can potentially decompose the determinants of profits into its more primitive components. However, to do so, we must first correct for selection bias stemming from the fact that we observe only the revenues or costs for the action that was ultimately chosen. By definition, this is the choice that maximized profits relative to all other options, implying that any unobserved shock that influences this discrete choice will have a direct impact on either revenue or costs, inducing a selection bias that must be accounted for in the outcome equation. Fortunately, by framing the underlying game as one of incomplete information, flexible (semi-parametric) methods for selection correction can be applied directly. We can then use selectivity-corrected outcome equations to construct either revenue or cost counterfactuals (depending on which type of data is actually observed) that approximate the difference between the chosen action and any feasible alternative. Drawing on a revealed preference argument, a final inequality estimator can then be used to recover the remaining parameters characterizing either revenues or costs.
In the simplest, fully parametric version of our approach, estimation consists of four steps, none more complicated that either a multinomial logit or a linear regression. Furthermore, because the initial stage of the estimation can be performed either market by market or firm by firm, our methods are robust to multiplicity of equilibria and can also be easily extended to account for heterogeneity, given access to sufficiently rich data.
We illustrate our estimation technique with an empirical exercise that builds on an earlier analysis of supermarket pricing strategies. In a recent paper, Ellickson and Misra (2008) model a supermarket's pricing decision as a discrete, store level game between rival chains and estimate the parameters of a reduced form profit function using techniques developed in Bajari et al. (2006) . While they find strong evidence of assortative matching by strategy (i.e. firms prefer to offer Every Day Low Prices (EDLP) when they expect their rivals to do likewise), they are unable to pin down exactly why such a strategy is profitable (i.e. is it revenues? or costs? or a combination of both?). However, by including data on revenues (along with the discrete strategic choice of pricing strategy), we are now able to do so.
We find that firms coordinate primarily to economize on costs. For example, firms that choose EDLP typically take a revenue hit relative to a PROMO strategy. However, the cost savings associated with EDLP outweigh the expected revenue loss, making it profitable on balance. Further, we also find that coordination of strategies across firms is mostly due to cost savings, as opposed to demand or revenue considerations. Finally, preliminary results suggest that these cost savings are driven by access to common suppliers.
Our approach draws on a rich body of literature spanning several areas of applied microeconomics and quantitative marketing. While empirical interest in discrete games began with the seminal work of Bresnahan and Reiss (1991a&b) , our approach is more closely connected to the incomplete information framework emphasized in Seim (2006) and Bajari et al (2006) . 1 In particular, the incomplete information assumption is key to breaking a system of equations into a collection of single agent problems in which selection can be addressed directly. The connection between selectivity and discrete games was first noted and addressed by Reiss and Spiller (1989) , and later by Mazzeo (2002) , both in the context of games of complete information. Our approach to selectivity clearly draws on the classic work of Heckman (1974 Heckman ( , 1979 , and most directly on the semi-parametric propensity-score based methods introduced by Robb (1985, 1986) and Ahn and Powell (1993) .
The mixed continuous-discrete choice structure of the problem has obvious antecedents in both the consumer demand literature (Dubin and McFadden (1984) , Hanemann (1984)) and empirical applications of the Roy (1951) model Honore (1990), Dahl (2002) ). Finally, the emphasis on inequality conditions derived from revealed preference arguments and the specific decomposition of the errors into structural and non-structural complements the recent literature on moment inequalities (Pakes et al. (2006) ).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a general model of strategic interaction and outlines our four step approach for selectivity-corrected estimation. Section 3 presents our empirical exercise and Section 4 concludes.
A Model of Strategic Interactions
Our model of strategic interactions is based on the static discrete game framework analyzed in Bajari et al (2006) . After introducing the basic notation, profit maximization conditions, and equilibrium concept, we outline our four-step estimation algorithm. Our algorithm proceeds as follows. The first step, which is common to the literature on discrete games, involves flexibly estimating firm beliefs using existing non-or semi-parametric techniques.
Note that these conditional choice probabilities will also form the basis of the selection 1 There is a wide and growing literature on discrete games in both economics and marketing. Notable examples include Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2007) , Berry (1992) , Berry, Ostrovsky, and Pakes (2007) , Draganska, Mazzeo, and Seim (2007) , Hartmann (2008) , Ho (2005) , Orhun (2006 ), Sweeting (2004 , Vitorino (2007) , and Zhu and Singh (2006) . correction utilized in step two. The second step involves estimating selectivity-corrected outcome equations, which yield consistent estimates of revenues (or costs, depending on the nature of available data) as a function of exogenous covariates and the (endogenous) actions of each firm's rivals. The third step requires constructing counterfactual revenue (or cost) differences, which are direct inputs to step four. The fourth and final step uses inequalities based on the necessary conditions for profit maximization to recover the remaining cost (or revenue) parameters. Standard errors are obtained via the bootstrap.
A Discrete Game of Incomplete Information
Although we will introduce a more complex notation for the subsequent empirical exercise, we work here with a simplified set-up that closely follows that of Bajari et al. (2006) . We assume that in each market (whose subscript we suppress for brevity), there are a finite number of players (i = 1, ..., n) each choosing a discrete action a i ∈ {0, 1, ..., K} simultaneously from a finite set. The set of possible action profiles is then A = {0, 1, ..., K} n with generic element a = (a 1 , ..., a n ), while the vector of player i's rivals' actions is then
The state vector for player i is denoted s i ∈ S i , while the state vector of all n players is s = (s 1 , ..., s n ) ∈ Π i S i . The state vector s is known to all firms and observed by the econometrician. It describes features of the market and characteristics of the firms that we assume are determined exogenously. For each firm, there are also two privately observed state variables. While each firm perfectly observes its own private state variables, they are known to the econometrician and its rival firms only in distribution. These privately observed state variables are denoted R i (a i ) and C i (a i ), or more compactly R i and C i , and represent firm specific shocks to the revenue (R) and cost (C) associated with each strategy. We will sometimes write the two element vector of private shocks as i . The private information assumption makes this a game of incomplete or asymmetric information and the appropriate equilibrium concept one of Bayes Nash Equilibrium (BNE). For any given market, the 's are assumed to be i.i.d. across firms and actions. They are drawn from a joint distribution f R i , C i that is known to everyone, including the econometrician. Both revenues and costs are also subject to a second pair of firm specific shocks denoted η R i and η C i (or, more compactly, η), each of which is assumed to be mean zero. Note that in contrast to the private information components ( R i and C i ), this additional source of randomness is not observed by the firm prior to making its discrete choice of action. Following Pakes et al (2006) , these ex post realizations could represent either expectation errors (due, perhaps, to incomplete or asymmetric information) or errors in the measurement of revenues or costs.
For notational simplicity, we will emphasize the former "expectational" interpretation in what follows.
Firms choose strategies with the objective of maximizing expected profits
broken out here as revenue minus costs. More generally, we could work instead with variable profits minus fixed costs, which might allow access to a deeper level of structure. However, since reliable data on costs is rarely available, we emphasize the current structure here.
The revenue and cost terms can be expressed more explicitly as
Consistent with the informational structure of the game, we assume firms choose the action a i that yields the highest expected profit relative to all alternatives, so that
for all k . Note that the expectation is over the actions of rival firms, as well as both expectation errors.
Constructing Firm Beliefs
As is now well known in the empirical games literature, the structure of a discrete game differs from a standard discrete choice model in that the actions of a firm's rivals enter its payoff function directly. In particular, the game structure transforms the standard single agent set-up problem into a system of simultaneous discrete choice problems. However, since this is a game of incomplete information, firms cannot perfectly predict the actions of their rivals. Moreover, since the 's are treated as private information, a particular
is a function of the state vector (s) and its own private information, but not the private information of its rivals. In other words, each firm's beliefs over what its competitors will do is a function of observables alone. Thus, from the perspective of its rivals, the probability that a given firm chooses action k conditional on the common state vector s is given by
where
is an indicator function equal to 1 if firm i chooses action k and 0 otherwise. We let P denote the set of these probabilities. Since the firm does not observe the actions of its competitors prior to choosing its own action, its decision is based on these expectations. For tractability, we assume the 's are additively separable and independent across firms and actions. These and other assumptions will be made clear in the sequel.
Incorporating Information on Post Choice Outcomes
What sets our estimation strategy apart from existing two-step approaches to estimating discrete games is the inclusion of post-choice outcome data. While this auxiliary data could potentially take many forms (e.g. prices, quantities, revenues, costs, etc.), we focus on revenues since 1) revenue data is often easier to obtain than information on costs, 2) price and quantity data would require the researcher to impose additional structure (e.g. a demand system and a price setting mechanism) that should be more closely tailored to the particular setting (see, for example, Ishii's (2004) application of Pakes et al (2006) to ATM networks or Reiss and Spiller's (1989) model of airline competition). However, given this additional structure, the basic estimation approach presented below could certainly be applied. The inclusion of revenue data also matches the empirical example presented below. Clearly, the case where costs are observed instead is completely analogous (albeit less cleanly identified, as discussed below). Of course, having actual variable profit data is also easily accommodated in our framework.
Calibrating Revenue
Given data on revenues, we assume they can be decomposed as some function of the state vector and observed player actions, along with an additive (private information) revenue shock R i (k) and an additive expectation error η R i (k) . In particular,
Since the error components (η and ) are indistinguishable from the perspective of the econometrician, the revenue function can equivalently be written as
Because we only observe revenues for the strategies that are actually chosen, there is a selectivity problem: firms choose the strategy that maximizes profits, based in part on the same unobservables R i (k) that impact revenues. In particular, E ω R i |a i = k = 0, although the selectivity bias is clearly driven by R i (k). Clearly, the revenue equation must be corrected to account for the sample selection bias induced by the underlying discrete game. Fortunately, the incomplete information structure allows this correction to take place using a standard, propensity-score based control function approach.
We will specify how this is done what follows. However, before doing so, we must first parameterize the cost function.
Cost Parameterization
We adopt a similar specification for the cost function as for revenue,
Once again, is treated as private information while η is expectation error that is realized ex post. However, since costs are unobserved, we must now employ a latent variable approach and work with cost differences rather than levels. We adopt the following structure for these differences
Note that since the firm makes its discrete decisions based on expected revenues and costs, the expectation errors (η) drop out, allowing realized actions to be replaced by expected actions (probabilities). In particular, since these "expectational" errors are unknown to the firm at the time that decisions are made, they can be "integrated out". Having parameterized the full model, we are now ready to outline our estimation algorithm.
Constructing the Likelihood
Let Ψ k i be an indicator function indicating that firm i chooses action k conditional on the common parameter vector (θ), the common vector of state variables (s), the firm's privately observed cost and revenue shocks ( ), and the expectations it has regarding the actions of its rivals (P) . This can be written as
Let g R|θ R , s, a, R be the joint conditional density of revenues generated by the expectation error terms (η). The conditioning reflects the fact that the observed vector of revenues (across players), R, is conditioned on the state variables (s), the revenue function parameters (θ R ), the (private) revenue shocks R , and the actions 2 of all players (a).
Finally, let k * denote observed actions.
Given these components, the overall sample likelihood can then be written as
A few comments on the structure of the likelihood function are warranted here. First, note that R and θ R enter both g and Ψ, reflecting the underlying structural connection 2 Note that revenues are a function of the realized actions of competing firms, not their expected actions. The expected actions of a firm's rivals impact its revenues only through that firm's choice of action.
between the discrete choice of action and the resulting equilibrium outcome. This is similar to the discrete-continuous demand model proposed by Hanemann (1984) , in which the choice of product impacts the choice of how much to consume through the underlying utilitytheoretic framework. However, in contrast to Hanemann's consumer demand context, our setting involves multiple agents interacting in a discrete game, with the observed choice probabilities representing the equilibrium outcome of this game. The equilibrium constraint forces the agents expectations (P) to match the corresponding equilibrium probabilities Ψ k i . This equilibrium constraint can complicate the evaluation of the likelihood function since the direct, nested fixed point approach (Rust, 1987) to satisfying this constraint is misspecified if there is more than one fixed point (see Su and Judd, 2007) . Finally, we note that even with an equilibrium selection rule in place, maximizing the constrained likelihood is a numerically challenging task. In what follows, we present a sequential estimation algorithm that greatly simplifies estimation.
Methodology: Sequential Estimation
In this section, we describe our general estimation strategy, which involves four sequential steps. The intuition behind the algorithm is straightforward: profits are the linear difference between revenues and costs. If we can characterize the impact of the state variables on revenues and use these functions to construct counterfactual revenues for the choices we do not observe, the conditions for profit maximization allow us to recover the effect of the state variables on costs. The four steps that constitute our estimation algorithm are listed below. In what follows, we discuss each step in detail.
Step 1: Flexibly estimate P as a function of all state variables, yielding P
Step 2: Using P, estimate selectivity-corrected revenue equations R i , yielding θ R
Step 3: Use θ R to construct counterfactual revenue differences ∆R i k, k |s, P, θ R where,
Step 4: Estimate cost function parameters (θ C ) from the profit maximizing conditions:
Step 1: Recovering equilibrium beliefs and constructing control functions
The first step is exactly the same exercise employed in the existing two-step estimation strategies for static games (e.g. Bajari et al (2006) ). Note that here (as there) it is crucial that the first step provide consistent estimates of the components of P, since these will in turn be used to construct estimates of players' expectations over rivals' actions. Furthermore, this estimate P is also the key component in the selectivity correction that follows, since we will be employing the control function approach suggested by Robb (1985, 1986) and Ahn and Powell (1993) . Clearly, there are numerous non-and semiparametric approaches to constructing P in a flexible manner. These might include simple frequencies, the method of sieves, kernel estimators, or series estimators. Ideally, the researcher should use non-parametric methods to implement this step since the true functional form of these reduced form choice probabilities is unlikely to to have a clean, closed form representation (even if the underlying profit function has a simple structure). Of course, if data limitations exist, one may have to employ less data intensive semi-parametric or even fully parametric methods.
Step 2: Estimating selectivity-corrected revenue functions
The second step recovers the parameters of the revenue function, correcting for the sample selection bias induced by the underlying discrete game. The approach advocated here follows the semi-parametric, propensity-score based methods suggested by Robb (1985, 1986) and Ahn and Powell (1993) which make relatively weak assumptions regarding the underlying selection mechanism. Implementation is straightforward. We show in the appendix that our approach amounts to running separate revenue regressions for each strategy (k) with an additional component Λ k P i which is a flexible function of P i .
Specifically, the regression equations are given by
In practice, the control function Λ k P i can be approximated using splines or series expansions (polynomials). The main advantage of this approach is that it relies only on P i in the correction term and does not require any parametric assumption on the error structure (apart from the index restriction common to all of these methods). While this flexibility does come at some cost, the alternative would be to impose particular distributions on the and η such that the selectivity correction is empirically tractable. This is not a trivial task since (i)
we are analyzing a multinomial choice problem and (ii) the same errors appear in both the selection equation (choice model) and in the outcome equation (revenue regression). These issues also distinguish our framework from the standard selectivity approach in which the errors in the two equations are simply assumed to be correlated (see e.g. Mazzeo (2002) ). 3 We should also note here that our problem simplifies greatly due to the private information assumptions made in the set-up of the discrete game. Since the private information components are i.i.d. across players and actions, the fact that these actions enter the regression equation does not raise endogeneity issues. In particular, the private information assumption (on ε) allows the joint selectivity problem (that the revenues of all players are conditioned on the actions of all players) to be decomposed into a collection of individual selectivity problems. 4 The revenues may ex-post be correlated across players on account of the expectation errors (η's), but this raises no further difficulties.
Step 3: Constructing counterfactual revenue differences
Having obtained θ R , the parameter vector characterizing the revenue function, in step 2, the next step is simply to construct counterfactual revenue differences ∆R i k, k |s, P, θ R where,
These counterfactual revenue differences (CRDs) represent the best approximation of the difference in revenues associated with making choice k instead of k . In practice, the CRDs are simply the fitted revenue differences between the strategy that was chosen (k) and those that were not (k ). Note here that ∆R i k, k |s, P, θ R is not the complete ex-ante expected revenue difference since it does not include the private information terms. However, this 3 Note that this does not preclude the econometrician from using specific distributions (say extreme value errors for ) since these assumptions can be imposed in the final step of our algorithm. Being agnostic about these errors at this point simply retains flexibility while also being fairly simple to implement. 4 Note that in cases where the cardinality of an individual firm's choice set is large (i.e. there are many potential discrete actions), the researcher will likely face a dimensionality issue in modeling Λ k Pi that is analogous to the curse of dimensionality associated with many multinomial choice problems. For example, constructing a control function via a second order polynomial approximation with J alternatives would require estimatiing J + Σ J i=1 i terms (so with 5 alternatives, one would have to estimate 20 parameters for the selectivity correction component alone).One possible solution to this is to assume that Dahl's (2002) index sufficiency assumption holds, and rely only on Λ k P k iq : q ⊂ K . Unfortunately, this reduction in dimension is somewhat ad-hoc in that it is not based on any utility theoretic primitive and is inconsistent with many canonical examples (e.g. multinomial probit). redounds to our advantage since we can now plug these CRD's into the structural choice problem to estimate the cost differences without worrying about the private information components. 5 Step 4: Estimating the remaining cost parameters from the profit maximization conditions Once the CRDs are known, the profit maximizing constraints in (4) can be used to estimate the parameters of the implied cost differences. The profit maximizing constraints outlined in (4) are equivalent to the following empirical condition:
where κ i = ∆ C i − ∆ R i represents the difference in the private information components for strategies k and k . Any set of parameters θ C that satisfies the above condition yields a consistent estimate of θ C . The estimation can be performed parametrically (using a multinomial logit, for example) by imposing specific assumptions on κ (via appropriate assumptions on the ) or semi-parametrically via maximum score. Alternatively, a bounds estimator similar to the moment inequalities approach proposed in Pakes et al. (2006) could also be used.
The estimation approach outlined here has been kept deliberately general. The actual implementation of the approach would require specific choices on the part of the researcher. In the empirical application that follows, we provide an concrete example of how these choices might be made in practice.
Discussion

Identification
In empirical static games, as in standard discrete choice models, identification of the latent profit or payoff parameters comes from the covariation between the explanatory variables and the revealed choice data. The identification of the strategic effects, however, is slightly more involved, requiring explicit exclusion restrictions. These exclusion restrictions usually take the form of continuous covariates that impact the payoffs of each individual player directly, but do not influence the payoffs of the other players (except through the expected actions). Given such exclusion restrictions, the strategic effects are identified since the variation in the beliefs a firm has over it's competitors actions are now driven at least partly by covariates that do not shift its own profits directly. 6 Our methodology also requires such exclusion restrictions.
In addition to having exclusion restrictions across firms we also need another set of exclusion restrictions within each firm. These restrictions are required to identify the revenue regression parameters. Since the selectivity correction term is also a function of state variables, its inclusion into the second step regression poses identification problems. The solution in the selectivity literature (see e.g. Vella (1993) ) is to have a set of variables that impact the discrete choice but are excluded in the regression specification. The economic structure of our problem helps in this regard since costs are, by definition, excluded from revenues. More precisely, all we need are variables that are assumed to affect costs but not revenues. Ideal exclusions, in our opinion, are variables that influence fixed costs since these can be assumed in most typical economic models to be independent of demand side constructs. Note that the two sets of exclusion restrictions (within and across firms) could overlap as long as they have some elements that are not common to both.
Inference
Since the multi-step structure of our estimation routine renders standard analytic approaches to inference intractable, we construct standard errors via the bootstrap. The construction of such a bootstrap procedure requires some care, since simply bootstrapping over observations would result in severe biases (i.e. we might drop a firm from a given market). In our application we bootstrap over markets which is effective since we have many markets that are assumed to be independent of each other. Future research might investigate other approaches such as subsampling or jack-knife methods.
Finally, the consistency of our estimates follow directly from the arguments laid out in the selectivity (Ahn and Powell, 1993) and static games (Bajari et al. 2006) literature.
Because our algorithm is simply an extension of standard "two-step" procedures, the usual arguments based on Newey and McFadden (1994) apply here as well. In general, as long as the first stage is consistently estimated, each subsequent stage will yield consistent estimates.
Application: Supermarket Pricing Strategies
To illustrate how our approach can be applied in practice, we extend the empirical model of supermarket pricing strategies introduced in Ellickson and Misra (2008) to incorporate store-level data on revenue. For the sake of brevity, we will provide only a cursory overview of the choice model and dataset here, referring readers to the previous paper for a more detailed description. Pricing decisions are modeled as a static, discrete game of incomplete information in which supermarket firms choose among three pricing strategies: Every Day Low Pricing (EDLP), Promotional Pricing (PROMO), and mixture of the two, commonly known as hybrid pricing (HYBRID). Firms choose the strategy that maximizes expected store-level profits given their beliefs regarding the actions of their rivals. Firms condition their choices on an underlying state variable that includes both store and firm level covariates, as well as market level demographics. Using a two-step estimation procedure based on Bajari et al. (2006) and Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) , Ellickson and Misra (2008) find that stores coordinate on the choice of strategy. For example, stores that choose EDLP expect to earn higher profits when their rivals do likewise. The purpose of the current exercise is to discover why.
Implementation
Our implementation follows the four step procedure described above. In the first step, we recover consistent estimates of the choice probabilities that will be used to construct the control functions employed in step two. Although firms are choosing among just three pricing strategies, the inclusion of a large number of continuous covariates precludes the use of fully flexible non-parametric methods for predicting probabilities (e.g. kernel, sieve, or series estimators). Therefore, we proceed semi-parametrically, estimating the first stage market by market using a flexible multinomial logit specification that includes higher order terms for each covariate, along with a set of bivariate interactions.
The consistent estimates of the choice probabilities (i.e. P) obtained in this first stage are used to construct the control functions that correct for selectivity in the second stage revenue regressions. Since we only model three choices, the curse of dimensionality that can arise in constructing such control functions is not a concern. Therefore, we do not need to make any additional assumptions (e.g. index sufficiency) to reduce the dimensionality. Given the large amounts of data at our disposal, we were able to employ third order polynomials to approximate Λ k (P). We also experimented with higher order terms but found only very small differences in the resulting estimates.
The third step is straightforward, simply requiring construction of predicted and counterfactual revenues, based on the observed covariates and the results of step 2. With these counterfactual revenue differences in hand, we move on to the final step, in which we recover the cost differences that rationalize the observed choices given the expected revenue differences that were constructed in step 3. Here we again follow a semi-parametric approach, this time based on pair-wise comparisons between the selected choice and each of the unchosen alternatives. In particular, we use a smoothed pair-wise maximum score procedure similar to the methods developed in Fox (2007) . The results of an alternative specification based on a simple multinomial logit framework (not reported) were broadly similar. All standard errors were constructed by bootstrapping over markets.
Results and Discussion
3.2.1
Step 1: Consistent Estimates of P As noted above, our first step was carried out using a flexible multinomial logit specification.
Since the coefficient estimates from this procedure are not particularly enlightening (and only the fitted values will be used in what follows), we simply note here that 64.8% of stores's pricing strategy were correctly classified by this first stage. This measure of fit is represented visually in Figure 1 , which plots the predicted profit differences (i.e. inverted probabilities) for each observation (store) in the dataset. The vertical axis shows HYBRID profits (relative to PROMO) while the horizontal axis plots EDLP (again versus PROMO).
The observations are color coded by strategy (HYBRID is orange, EDLP is blue, and HYBRID is black), yielding a clear visual indication of relative fit. This should provide some level of confidence in the selection corrections that follow.
Step 2: Revenue Function Estimates
In step 2, we project observed store level revenues onto several covariates characterizing the relative size and attractiveness of a given market, along with two measures of rival actions (the share of rival stores choosing EDLP and PROMO, respectively). These revenue regressions are corrected for selectivity using the control functions described above. The results of this exercise are presented in Table 1 . The first three columns contain revenue regressions for EDLP, HYBRID, and PROMO respectively, while the last two contain the coefficients for EDLP and HYBRID differenced against PROMO. With the exception of the number of families 7 and two additional covariates, all regressors are significant at the 1% level. As one might expect, store size, median rent, and median income all have a large, positive and significant impact on revenue, irrespective of the choice of pricing strategy.
Similarly, both the percentage of minority residents and the median number of vehicles have a negative impact. The latter covariate most likely reflects consumers' ability to search. Note that, consistent with the predictions of Lal and Rao (1997) , the PROMO strategy is hurt the least by consumer search, reflecting their view that this "hi-lo" pricing strategy is explicitly aimed at "cherry pickers". Focusing on the strategic effects, we find that, consistent with standard arguments regarding "business stealing" (congestion) effects, the revenue of every strategy is decreasing in the proportion of rivals who choose that same strategy. While this might at first appear to contradict the findings presented in Ellickson and Misra (2008) , an examination of the relative effects reveals that this is not in fact the case. For example, although the presence of competing EDLP stores reduces the revenues that a particular store can expect to earn by choosing EDLP, the damage to a store that selects PROMO instead is even greater. However, as we will see later, this revenue differential is small compared to the relative cost advantage of choosing EDLP versus PROMO.
Step 3: Constructing Counterfactual Revenue Differences
Having obtained revenue estimates in step 2, this next step simply involves constructing counterfactual revenue differences -the expected gain (or loss) from choosing an alterna-tive pricing strategy. The results of this exercise are presented in Figure 2 , which display histograms for EDLP and HYBRID (versus PROMO) for the stores that actually chose each of these strategies. We see that, amongst stores choosing EDLP, about a third would sustain a revenue hit by switching to PROMO. However, the majority of such stores would actually stand to gain revenue by switching to PROMO, implying that substantial cost saving must be working to offset the forgone revenue (we verify this claim in the following section). Interestingly, the analogous data for HYBRID stores are quite different: the vast majority of HYBRID stores would lose revenue by switching to PROMO, indicating a more limited role for costs. However, to recover the actual cost implications of choosing HYBRID (and verify our claim regarding EDLP), we must turn to the cost differences recovered in step 4.
Step 4: Cost Function Estimates
The final step of our four step procedure involves comparing the counterfactual revenue differences constructed in step 3 to the actual choices that each store made in order to back out the cost differentials that rationalize their observed actions. Before discussing the coefficient estimates from our smoothed pair-wise maximum score procedure, we present two figures that illustrate the overall fit of the model along with the primary factors driving each strategic choice. Figure 3 plots both the revenue and cost differences of EDLP versus PROMO for stores that actually chose EDLP. The red line represents the locus of indifference points where the revenue and cost differences coincide. The region with the highest density of observations is the lower left quadrant, to the right of the red line. This means that, relative to PROMO, stores choose EDLP primarily to economize on costs. In particular, for the typical store choosing EDLP over PROMO, the amount they expected to gain in costs outweighed the amount they expect to lose in revenues. In contrast, Figure 4 shows that the decision to choose HYBRID (rather than PROMO) is driven by a combination of both revenues and costs. The highest density region is in the lower right quadrant, implying dominance along both dimensions.
Turning next to the coefficient estimates, we can identify the covariates that drive these cost differences. Note that the estimates presented in Table 2 are directly comparable to those presented in the last two columns of Table 1 , as everything is now expressed in differences. Firm characteristics enter as expected, with increased store size, chain size, and vertical integration all reducing the costs of both EDLP and HYBRID relative to PROMO. Not surprisingly, the impact of vertical integration is a particularly strong factor in the EDLP/PROMO comparison, reflecting the firm level investments needed to profitably implement EDLP. However, the most interesting results are those involving strategic interaction. The large negative coefficient on the share of EDLP rivals in the first column implies that coordinating on EDLP actually reduces costs relative to PROMO. The same is true for HYBRID. Moreover, the magnitudes of these effects are significantly larger in magnitude than the ones we found on the revenue side, indicating that the primary reason firms are coordinating on pricing strategies is to reduce costs.
The relative size of these effects can be gauged by examining Table 3 , which reports average cost, revenue and profit differences for stores that choose EDLP or HYBRID versus PROMO. In particular, choosing EDLP yields an average cost savings of $823,392 over PROMO, which is about 5.75% of average (store-level) revenues. However, this choice yields an average decrease in revenue of $447,356. The net profit difference is $376,063, reflecting the greater magnitude of the cost savings. In contrast, choosing HYBRID yields substantial gains along both dimensions.
Concluding remarks
This paper proposes a novel approach to incorporating outcome information into static games of incomplete information. A simple four step estimation recipe is provided along with an application outlining implementation details and new insights obtained. All coefficients are significant at the 1% level, with the exception of those denoted "ns". 
Appendix
The probability of firm i choosing action k can be described as a function of state variables as follows (see equation 5 in the text):
Recall as well that the revenue and cost equations are approximated as
Define,
E π
If strategy k was chosen by firm i (we ignore the market subscript in what follows) we know that
In other words
Now,
In fact given the independence of and η,
Letting g ∆π k i |π i denote the density of ∆π k i .this expectation can be written as
Since by the i.i.d. assumption, C i (k) is independent of R i (k ) and C im (k ) .It is easy to see that this expectation will only be a function of profit indices, π i = π 1 i , π 2 i , ..., π K i .
In other words,
where Λ k is some function. Given the one to one correspondence between π i and P i this can equivalently be expressed as,
and the selectivity corrected regression can be run as,
where Λ k (z) is some function of the vector z, and P i is a consistent estimator of P i andω R i (k) is a homoskedastic, mean zero error term. In practice the function Λ k can be approximated by available flexible methods (polynomial series, splines etc.)
